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This paper discusses the relevant cost standard for the economic replicability test for Next-
Generation Access (NGA) networks, described in the “Recommendation on consistent non-
discrimination obligations and costing methodologies” adopted by the European Commis-
sion. According to the Recommendation, in order to reconcile investment and competition,
wholesale prices should have nonlinear characteristics and only partly vary by the number
of accesses. It demonstrates that a cost standard for the economic replicability test, which
implies fully fixed and variable cost recovery for the access seeker, including the total
wholesale price, would be incompatible with the economics of NGA networks and that such
a test would deter NGA investment. Therefore, the cost standard should include only the
variable part of the wholesale price. However, this paper underlines that during a transition
phase, until competitors have secured access to NGA infrastructure, a second temporary test
called the “competition migration test” should be added to ensure incumbent NGA retail
prices do not foreclose efficient copper-based entrants. The two proposed tests surpass the
limits of the “ladder of investment” theory by including the “business migration effect”
developed by Bourreau, Cambini, and Dogan (2012).
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
On 12 July 2012, Neelie Kroes, Vice-President of the European Commission (EC) charged with the Digital Agenda,
announced a far-reaching set of measures to enhance the broadband investment environment to meet the objectives of the
Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) by 2020.
Neelie Kroes considered that regulatory policy for next-generation access (NGA) should be based on the following key
elements: stable copper prices and flexible NGA wholesale access prices combined with high non-discrimination obliga-
tions, including “a properly-specified ex ante “margin squeeze” test.”
Details of the test are provided in the European Commission “Recommendation on consistent non-discrimination
obligations and costing methodologies to promote competition and enhance the broadband investment environment”
adopted on 11 September 2013. In this Recommendation, the ex-ante margin squeeze test was renamed the “economic
replicability test” (ERT) to avoid any confusion between current practices in the context of broadband regulation and this
new NGA regulation tool.er Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
.
e authors’ and may not under any circumstances be regarded as those of Orange.
unaux).
L. Jaunaux, M. Lebourges / Telecommunications Policy 39 (2015) 486–501 487The Recommendation (see Annex II pp. 27–29 for specifications) suggests that the test should be done with a discounted
cash flow (DCF) on an average customer lifetime and account for long-run incremental costs plus (LRICþ) as a cost standard.
At the same time, the costing methodology for the EC should guarantee an “appropriate balance between ensuring efficient
entry and sufficient incentives to invest.” According to the document, this would imply allowing operators investing in NGA
networks a certain degree of pricing flexibility. This flexibility would enable significant market power (SMP) operators and
access seekers to “share some of the investment risk by differentiating wholesale access prices according to the access
seeker’s level of commitment.” The EC views volume discounts and/or long-term access pricing agreements as important
tools for fostering NGA investment. This implies that the total wholesale price paid by the access seeker is not necessarily
strictly proportional to the number of accesses, as it may include elements such as a minimum fee, discounts above certain
volumes, upfront payment or co-financing arrangements. This paper models all these forms of nonlinear wholesale access
price structures as “two-part tariffs.” In this simplified model, the variable part of the wholesale two-part tariff is by
definition the part of the wholesale price actually paid by the access seeker that is proportional to its number of accesses. All
other components of the wholesale price will be considered as the fixed part of the wholesale price.
This type of price structure reflects the underlying investment cost structure for an operator that invests in fibre to replace
its copper access network, since a large part of its investment cost is fixed and independent of demand that is otherwise
uncertain. In this case, the economic analysis shows that optimal wholesale prices should include a fixed component in order
to effectively allocate the risk that fixed costs may not be covered if demand is low. In this context, the proportion of the access
network cost that may be legitimately subject to a form of nonlinear wholesale pricing depends of the proportion of the
copper access network being replaced with fibre. Thus, when NGAs take the form of “Fibre to the Node” (FTTN) or “Fibre to the
Cabinet” (FTTC), for which only a limited proportion of copper is replaced by fibre, wholesale prices are only slightly nonlinear,
for instance through limited volume discounts. In this scenario, a large part of the wholesale price stays variable and the fixed
part is relatively small. On the other hand, when NGAs take the form of “Fibre to the Home” (FTTH) where the copper access
network is completely replaced by fibre, wholesale prices may be much less linear, using approaches like co-financing for the
fixed infrastructure, significant upfront payment or more significant volume or duration discounts. In this case, the proportion
of the total wholesale price that is actually proportional to the number of access is lower.
This paper addresses the question of how to implement the economic replicability test for NGA networks recommended by
the European Commission in such a context. The Recommendation itself suggests the use of nonlinear wholesale pricing, but
does not consider the implications for the ER test. Determining how to implement the test when wholesale prices are nonlinear
requires further investigation. Academics and institutions have analysed “margin squeeze” in depth (for instance, see Jullien, Rey,
Saavedra (2013) for an overview), but only for linear wholesale prices. Indeed, the question of how economic replicability or
margin squeeze tests should be implemented when wholesale prices are nonlinear has not been formally analysed. Moreover,
the recommended test should be structured to fulfil the EC's dual objective of encouraging NGA investment and maintaining the
competitive structure inherited from copper unbundling while following the principle of fair investment risk distribution
between access provider and access seekers.1 The novelty of this paper is also the proposal for a solution for two-part wholesale
prices, with different and complementary regulatory regimes for the variable and fixed parts of wholesale prices.
The paper mainly addresses the case of total replacement of the copper infrastructure by an NGA network. However, the
proposal would remain valid in intermediate situations requiring partial replacement of copper networks, but its
significance would be reduced in due proportion.
Although the paper directly refers to the EC Recommendation on consistent non-discrimination obligations and costing
methodologies, the economic arguments would also be suitable for a margin squeeze test under competition law.
This paper aims at addressing the key implementation issue of the 2013 EC Recommendation on non-discrimination and
costing. Therefore, it does not cover important subjects for access regulation, which are not covered in the Recommenda-
tion, such as geographical segmentation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the notion of “economic replicability test” and
details the EC formulation in the Recommendation on Cost Orientation and Non-discrimination. Section 3 is the core of the
paper, it demonstrates that a test that implies full fixed and variable cost recovery would deter NGA investment. It shows
that to reconcile investment and competition, the economic replicability test should only include the variable part of
wholesale prices. However, during a transitional phase until competitors have migrated from copper to NGA networks, a
temporary test called the “competition migration test” should be added to ensure that the incumbent does not foreclose
efficient copper-based entrants. Finally, Section 4 discusses how the two-test system proposed can be integrated into
existing regulatory theory and practice.2. Economic replicability test: deﬁnition and EC formulation of the test for NGA Networks
In the Recommendation on consistent non-discrimination obligations and costing methodologies published on
September 11, 2013, the European Commission advocates allowing for a certain degree of pricing flexibility for NGA1 EC Recommendation C(2013) 5761 final, 11.9.2013 on non-discrimination and costing. Annex II “When setting the parameters of the ex-ante
economic replicability test, NRAs should ensure that the SMP operator is not put at a disadvantage vis-à-vis access seekers regarding the sharing of the
investment risk.”
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flexibility is considered by the EC to be without prejudice to the extent that the upstream and downstream prices are
constrained by an ex-ante economic replicability test.2.1. General definition of economic replicability and margin squeeze test
The term “economic replicability test” was introduced by the Recommendation on consistent non-discrimination
obligations and costing methodologies (2013), Formally, it is considered by the European Commission as a new NGA
regulation tool aiming at safeguarding competition in cases where wholesale price regulation should not be imposed on the
SMP operator. The specific objectives of the test are defined in the Recitals (62) of the Recommendation: “The purpose of
the economic replicability test is to ensure, in combination with the other competitive safeguards introduced such as EoI,
the technical replicability test, and a demonstrable retail price constraint resulting from a copper anchor or alternative
infrastructures, that SMP operators do not abuse this pricing flexibility to exclude potential competitors from the market.”
However, the BEREC in the draft Guidance on the regulatory accounting approach to the economic replicability test (i.e.
ex-ante/sector specific margin squeeze tests), page 5, noticed that “the ERT can be considered as a new term for the ex-ante
margin squeeze test which is already known from both, current practices from the regulators and also in ex-post form as a
practice known (in principle) from competition law.”
Beside, in 2010, the European Commission’s Recommendation on regulated access to NGA networks highlighted that
“ex ante margin squeeze tests” are appropriate tools for NGA networks when mandated access is not cost-oriented.
In this paper, the term “ex ante margin squeeze test” is reserved for the description of current practices notably in the
context of broadband regulation, while the term “economic replicability test” is used to refer to the Recommendation as
dedicated to the fulfilment of economic non-discrimination obligations imposed on NGA networks, absent other forms of
access price regulation.
As noted by the European Commission in Annex II of the Recommendation: “The guidance provided for the ex-ante economic
replicability test referred to in point 56 and in the present Annex is limited to the scope of this Recommendation, which relates to
the application of Articles 15 and 16 of Directive 2002/21/EC together with Articles 10 and 13 of Directive 2002/19/EC, and
therefore applies in different circumstances than ex-ante margin squeeze tests applied on regulated wholesale access prices and
is entirely without prejudice to application of the competition rules by the Commission and/or national competent authorities,
and to their interpretation by the General Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union.”
From a regulatory perspective, the ex-ante approach adopted by the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) may differ
from the competition authorities’ ex-post approach when it comes to margin squeeze.
Regulatory and competition policies address the common objective of ensuring efficient market competition for the benefit
of consumers. However, the two policies address different sides of the issue. Competition policy is designed to preserve
competition in a market where competition is established, and would act ex-post if a dominant company is alleged to have
abused its position to harm competitors and consumers. Competition authorities base their margin squeeze test on case law. In
the telecommunications industry, three notable cases (Deutsche Telekom in 2003, Telefónica in 2007 and TeliaSonera in 2011)
substantially contributed to the definition of margin squeeze. Regulatory policy aims at promoting competition and act ex-ante
to prevent abuses in specific markets characterized by a monopoly or a company with significant market power.2
From an economic point of view, the margin squeeze test used ex-post for competition law procedure or ex-ante by
regulatory authorities or the economic replicability created for the purpose of the Recommendation are based on the same
principles that can be expressed as follows: there is a margin squeeze when a vertically-integrated company that provides
essential input to downstream competitors charges retail and input prices that do not leave a sufficient economic margin for
efficient competitors to make positive profits. Therefore, there is no margin squeeze if the consumer retail price for the
incumbent’s downstream branch covers its upstream and downstream unit costs (Gaudin and Saavedra, 2014).
pZaþc
where p is the retail price, a is the wholesale access charge per access and c is the downstream cost per customer.
This condition guarantees that an efficient competitor could not be excluded from the market. The equation above shows
that the test is clearly specified only when wholesale prices are proportional to the volume of access.
European Union competition law, clearly expressed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its TeliaSonera and Deutsche
Telekom judgments, recognizes margin squeeze as a separate, stand-alone form of abusive behaviour prohibited by Article
102 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. This view is in contrast to the US Supreme Court’s view. In the
Linkline case, the US Supreme Court rejected the very notion that a margin squeeze itself could constitute a separate form of
violation of the Sherman Act §2. Instead, it limited the claim to cases where vertically-integrated companies apply predatory
pricing in the downstream market.
In the European view, the occurrence of a margin squeeze is nevertheless subject to several conditions explicitly
mentioned in the Court’s TeliaSonera decision, and it is not clear whether these conditions will be met if the test is applied2 See Gaudin and Saavedra (2014) for further details.
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constructive proposals for building the economic replicability test.
2.2. Economic replicability test for NGA networks in the European Commission Recommendation on consistent
non-discrimination obligations and costing methodologies
The deployment of NGAs is one of the core objectives of the 2020 Digital Agenda for Europe. The economic replicability
test should therefore preserve the competitive structure inherited from unbundling regulation of the copper local loop and
promote efficient investment and innovation in new infrastructures. The EC has to ensure that the ex-ante economic
replicability test for NGAs allows for an appropriate balance between these two objectives.
The Recommendation specifies the different parameters of the test, i.e., the relevant downstream costs, cost standard,
regulated wholesale inputs, relevant retail products and time period for running the test.
The relevant downstream costs are “estimated on the basis of the costs of the SMP operator’s own downstream
businesses (EEO test). NRAs should use the SMP operator’s audited downstream costs, provided they are sufficiently
disaggregated.”
According to the Recommendation, the relevant cost standard pertains to the long-run incremental costs plus (LRICþ),
including sunk costs.
NRAs should identify the most relevant regulated input used or expected to be used by access seekers.
NRAs should also define the most relevant retail products including broadband services, i.e., “flagship products” offered
by the SMP operator on the basis of their market observations. Those observations should include an assessment of retail
market shares in volume and value.
Finally, NRAs should measure the profitability of the flagship products on the basis of a dynamic multi-period analysis,
such as the discounted cash flow (DCF) approach on an average customer lifetime.
2.3. The EC Recommendation encourages nonlinear wholesale price structures
The Recommendation itself, particularly in Recitals (19)3 and (49), opens the door to using nonlinear wholesale prices.
Pricing flexibility must allow SMP operators and access seekers to share the investment risks by differentiating wholesale
access prices according to the access seeker’s level of commitment. In this context, volume discounts and/or long-term
access pricing agreements are considered by the EC as important tools for fostering NGA investment.
The use of nonlinear access prices is in line with the principles adopted in articles 84 and 125 of the framework directive. The
principle of nonlinear wholesale access pricing was also already acknowledged in the September 2010 NGA Recommendation
(2010/572/EU) in Recital (25)6. In this NGA Recommendation, the European Commission advocated mutualisation and co-
investment, which are also forms of nonlinear access price and comprise two elements, one fixed and the other variable.
In the NGA context, a nonlinear access charge would be composed of:obl
inv
disc
dist
wh
coo
the
invA wholesale variable access price that is directly proportional to the number of customers;
 Other elements of the wholesale price which are not proportional to the volume of access and which will hereafter be
considered part of the fixed wholesale price and does not vary by volume of access.
This type of wholesale price structure is consistent with the cost structure of the investment, where there are necessarily
both a fixed cost for shared infrastructure deployment and specific costs incurred for each new customer on the NGA
infrastructure.
The two-part wholesale price structure encouraged by the Recommendation on NGAs is also in line with lessons from
the economics analysis. According to the current literature, two-part tariffs are a good instrument for solving the dynamic
consistency and regulatory commitment issues by conciliating access obligations and investment incentives.
Most of the literature on competition policy considers linear access tariffs in accordance with the past practices of
regulatory authorities. Until recently, regulatory authorities had been dealing with existing infrastructures without
seeking to promote investment with an increasing return to scale, so linear pricing was sufficient. Furthermore, nonlinear3 “Volume discounts and/or long-term access pricing agreements are an important tool to foster NGA investment (…)”.
4 Art.8.5.(d) FWD “promoting efficient investment and innovation in new and enhanced infrastructures, including by ensuring that any access
igation takes appropriate account of the risk incurred by the investing undertakings and by permitting various cooperative arrangements between
estors and parties seeking access to diversify the risk of investment, whilst ensuring that competition in the market and the principle of non-
rimination are preserved;”
5 Art.12.3. FWD “…have the power to impose obligations in relation to the sharing of wiring inside buildings or up to the first concentration or
ribution point where this is located outside the building, on the holders of the rights referred to in paragraph 1 and/or on the owner of such wiring,
ere this is justified on the grounds that duplication of such infrastructure would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. Such sharing or
rdination arrangements may include rules for apportioning the costs of facility or property sharing adjusted for risk where appropriate.”
6 “Where SMP operators offer lower access prices for the unbundled fibre loop in return for up-front commitments on long-term or volume contracts,
se should not be regarded as unduly discriminatory where NRAs are satisfied that the lower prices appropriately reflect an actual reduction of the
estment risk.”
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prices (Vogelsang, 2003). However, nonlinear risk sharing arrangements were already being advocated by Nitsche and
Wiethaus (2009).
Later, Brito, Pereira, and Vareda (2010) suggested that since new technological developments provide an opportunity to
invest in new infrastructures, “it comes as natural that, in light of these changes, regulators should use new regulatory
instruments.” In this context, the addition of a fixed fee appears to the authors as the obvious solution. Brito et al. (2010)
study this specific issue in a duopoly model where a vertically-integrated incumbent is competing with a downstream
entrant. The regulator sets the access tariff to the incumbent’s network. They point out that the trade-off may generate a
“dynamic consistency problem.” Before the network is deployed, it is socially optimal to a set high access charge to
encourage investment. After the network is deployed, it is socially optimal to lower the access tariff to promote competition
in the retail market. The authors show that this dynamic consistency problem has a negative impact on NGA investment.
“The incumbent anticipates that it will be expropriated from the incremental profit of its investment and reduces
investment.” They demonstrate that two-part tariffs can solve this dynamic consistency issue because the regulator obtains
an additional instrument—the fixed fee—to encourage the incumbent to invest. If the investment cost is low,
the regulator can set the marginal price for the access tariff at marginal cost and use the fixed fee as an incentive for the
incumbent to invest. If the investment cost amounts to an intermediate value, the fixed fee is no longer
enough to induce investment. The regulator has to raise the marginal price of the access tariff above marginal cost.
In these circumstances, a regulatory moratorium could emerge as socially optimal. Two-part access prices and a
degree of price flexibility are thus complementary instruments. If the investment cost is high, investment is not socially
desirable.
Lestage and Fletcher (2011) also find in their model on investment games that a two-part tariff results in better social
welfare than a linear access price. They found that the flat fee reduces the optimal variable fee and that the variable part
should be cost-oriented only when service-based competition is feasible. The variable fee is above marginal cost when
facility-based competition is possible. Raising the access price reduces welfare under service-based competition and makes
duplication more socially desirable, which in turn improves welfare.
On the other hand, Tselekounis and Varoutas (2013) analyse the relationship between NGA investments and access prices
under regulatory uncertainty, conversely showing that in a linear wholesale price setting, it is difficult for regulation to
provide socially desirable incentives.
To summarise, a degree of wholesale price flexibility appears necessary for NGA regulation:– Flexibility in wholesale price structures: nonlinear or two-part access charges as advocated in the EC Recommendation
are an adequate instrument, on the wholesale price side, to reconcile downstream competition and upstream
investment;– Flexibility in wholesale price levels: according to the EC Recommendation, NGA wholesale prices should not be cost-oriented
if the NGA infrastructure is under the competitive pressure of other access platforms, including legacy copper infrastructure.
2.4. How should an economic replicability test be applied with two-part wholesale pricing?
Variable fees are much easier for regulatory authorities to regulate than fixed fees. Indeed regulating fixed fees appears
difficult because it presupposes a rule for spreading the fixed costs among operators. It may be possible to spread fixed costs
based on market share. However, in a growing market, this distribution is likely to become invalid very quickly. It would
seem difficult and hardly effective to constantly adapt regulations to market characteristics. Moreover, this would de facto
transform the fixed fee into a variable price, under the form of a mark-up on top of the variable price, thus eliminating the
economic benefits of a two-part access price structure.
A two-part structure makes it possible to accurately consider the singularity of an NGA investor’s cost structure
characterized by a significant part of fixed costs.
However, the compatibility between the objectives of the European Commission and the parameters of the test is not self-
evident. An LRICþ test as required by the Recommendation could be formally interpreted accounting for both the fixed and
variable parts of the wholesale price, if the fixed part of the wholesale price is included in the cost base, for instance
in reference to the “þ” in the LRICþcost standard. But since the fixed part of wholesale prices reflects high NGA investment costs
with a long and uncertain payback period, it would be inappropriate to include the fixed wholesale price in the test using a DCF
method on a customer lifetime. Applying this method systematically yields negative test results. If the estimation is made
considering the infrastructure’s lifetime, results would be at least as uncertain as the long-term profitability of the NGA
investment itself.
It is difficult to find a formal way to regulate both fixed and variable fees based on a single condition, particularly given
that, as mentioned previously, fixed fees are by nature very difficult to regulate.
Section 3 demonstrates that these reasons imply leaving the wholesale fixed price out of the test; only the variable price
is constrained in the economic replicability test proposed in this paper. It guarantees there is no discrimination on the basis
of variable costs for all operators with access to NGA infrastructure.
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infrastructure will be addressed separately and introduce a second complementary “competition migration test.”
3. Two tests that resolve the dilemma of maintaining competition while encouraging NGA investment
This section first demonstrates that an economic replicability test including fully fixed and variable cost recovery for the
access seeker would be inappropriate in an NGA context because all NGA investment risk would be concentrated on the access
provider and none on the access seeker, contrary to the objective in Annex II of the Recommendation “not to put the SMP
operator at a disadvantage,” thereby discouraging investment. It then describes the characteristics of the economic replicability
test that should be applied. This test includes only variable costs and excludes the fixed part of the wholesale price from the cost
standard to guarantee fair and vibrant competition between access providers and access seekers, once access seekers have
managed to secure access to the NGA infrastructure. Lastly, the second test called the “competition migration test” is described. It
is designed to put access providers and seekers on a level playing field for negotiating fixed wholesale prices and ensure a
competitive market structure. This test should be maintained during the migration from copper to NGA infrastructure.
3.1. A cost standard that includes fully fixed and variable cost recovery in the economic replicability test for NGA networks would
be inappropriate and discourage investment
Investing in NGA networks involves well-known7 risks that can be summarized as follows:–lowThe economic risk of weak current demand and uncertain future demand for new services against the backdrop of
consistently decreasing prices. This situation is inherent to the small number of services which are only possible over
very fast broadband. This undoubtedly has an impact on consumer willingness to pay for NGA services. Rosston, Savage,
and Waldman (2010) point out that the difference in American consumer willingness to pay for fast or very fast
broadband is low (about $3.00). However, a short-term pricing policy aimed at achieving immediate economic
equilibrium would be counterproductive because it would lead to prohibitive prices. There is thus a conflict between
retail prices that allow retail earnings to cover full costs and retail prices that consumers are willing to pay8;– Competition with other platforms, such as cable networks, increases uncertainties in demand and affects investor market
share, and thereby revenues;– The NGA investment is largely fixed, sunk and long-term (long amortisation periods). The NGA revenues characterized by
the weakness of the demand may not be sufficient for recovering the high investment costs;– The regulatory uncertainty. The perception of regulatory instability hinders firm investments and undermines the
effectiveness of regulatory initiatives.
The European Commission itself acknowledges that the profitability of NGA investment is uncertain. The European Commission
Communication (2013) states on page 4 “Divergent regulation of fixed networks often means overregulation, or regulatory
uncertainty and unpredictability, making it hard to plan investment in fast, “next generation” broadband networks” and on page 7
“Legal certainty is particularly important given that investment in fast broadband networks incurs significant costs, while demand
for end product remains uncertain.” The European Commission Recommendation (2013) states on pages 2 and 3 that investment in
broadband networks must be promoted and triggered. Instilling confidence in investors is essential, as is long term predictability
“beyond the lifetime of an individual market review.” These quotes show that the Commission does not take NGA investment for
granted. The NGA market in most European countries is entering a transitional phase. For the moment, the demand for NGA
networks is still weak and gradual. It is following an S-curve where the initial investment is massive and deployment time is long.
This analysis of NGA investment profitability is highly relevant for the specification of the test since it affects the economic replicability
test results. If the cost standard of the test includes all fixed and variable costs (LRICþ approach), as in the analysis of NGA investment
profitability, and if the latter is uncertain in the long term and negative in the short term, then a positive test result (i.e., proof that a
potential sufficient margin allows competitors to enter the market, a guarantee of positive business for access seekers) can only be
obtained if the access provider’s wholesale business is uncertain in the long term and negative in the short term, as it will formally be
demonstrated below. Using this type of test, access seekers and access providers would compete on equal footing in the retail market, but
access seekers would benefit from guaranteed profitability due to the economic replicability test, while the access provider would bear all
the investment risks. Access seekers would be much better off than access providers and no one would have an interest in investing.
This can be formalised by the following simple reasoning. The profit of NGA activity (or NGA Business Case “NGA BC”) for
a regulated network operator investing in NGA and has NGA retail and wholesale activities can be expressed as follows:
NGA BC ¼m retail revenuesdownstream costsupstream costsð Þ
þ 1mð Þ  ðwholesale revenueupstream costsÞ7 See for example, Oxera (2011) and Katsianis et al. (2012).
8 This is also true on the wholesale market: a conventional BU LRICþ cost-oriented linear wholesale access price applied to NGA infrastructure with
penetration rates would lead to prohibitively high values, which are incompatible with adoption by any customer.
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for the regulated operator, and downstream costs and upstream costs are costs per unit of market share for the regulated
operator for its retail activities and wholesale activities (including investment in NGA infrastructure), respectively. As the
regulated operator is subject to non-discrimination obligations, its upstream costs per unit of market share are identical for
self-supply for its own retail business and for providing access to its retail competitors on the wholesale market. If the
regulated operator has a retail market share m, then its competitors have an overall market share (1–m) generating
wholesale revenues per unit of competitor market share.
The mathematical equation above can be modified as follows:
NGA BC ¼m retail revenuesdownstream costswholesale revenueþwholesale revenueupstream costsð Þ
þ 1mð Þ  ðwholesale revenueupstream costsÞ
After some elementary algebra, this leads to
m economic replicability testð Þ ¼NGA BCðwholesale revenueupstream costsÞ
This expression indicates that whether an economic replicability test is positive or negative directly depends on whether the
difference between the profitability of NGA investment and the profitability of NGA wholesale business is, itself, positive or negative.
The profitability of the NGAwholesale business activity has to be below the NGA Business Case for the economic replicability test to be
positive. More specifically, the expression shows that if the NGA business case is negative, then the NGAwholesale activity (wholesale
revenue–upstream costs) in the above formula will be even more negative if the economic replicability test is positive.
The quotes provided at the beginning of this section indicate that the European Commission, as the majority of the sector, is
already aware of the long-term uncertainty of NGA investment profitability and that is certainly negative in the short timeframe
of a customer lifetime. Therefore, a positive NGA economic replicability test that includes the fixed part of wholesale prices and is
calculated for a customer lifetime can only be obtained if the profitability of the wholesale activity is negative. This type of test
would thus guarantee the business profitability of the access seeker while weakening the upstream business, thereby making
upstream investments economically irrational for investors. Therefore, this formulation of the test is inconsistent with the EC’s
assigned objective of SMP operators sharing investment risks with access seekers (see exact wording from EC in footnote 4).
The same point can be demonstrated using a simplified but representative numerical example based on Fibre to the
Home (FTTH) investment (see Appendix for a detailed hypothesis and an analysis of this numerical example). This example
demonstrates that if fixed wholesale prices are included in the test, then a negative result (implying a supposed foreclosure
strategy) is obtained, even if it is abundantly clear there is no form of discrimination whatsoever. The example simulates an
LRICþ test using a DCF method and including all of the access seeker’s fixed and variable costs in the cost standard.
The following assumptions are considered: the access seeker receives fully cost-oriented non-discriminatory access from
the FTTH investor (price equals cost in level and structure) and achieves a 50% market share. Therefore, the access provider
and the access seeker are facing exactly the same economic situation, which excludes any form of discrimination from the
access provider against the access seeker.
Two ex-ante demand scenarios are considered:copPositive scenario: the spontaneous migration of customers from a copper network to an NGA is achieved in five years,9
the penetration rate p is equal to 20% in Year 1, 40% in Year 2, 60% in Year 3, 80% in Year 4, 100% in Year 5;
 Negative scenario: the migration is achieved in 20 years, the penetration rate increases by 5% each year.
Two alternative calculation hypotheses are used where the test is conducted by alternately applying a customer lifetime
of, for instance, five years and an infrastructure lifetime of twenty years. As mentioned above, the DCF method on a
customer lifetime is recommended by the European Commission in the Recommendation published in September 2013.
If a DCF method is performed on a customer lifetime, this numerical example shows that the profitability of FTTH
investment is always negative, regardless of the speed of migration.
If the estimation is made using a DCF method on an infrastructure lifetime (20 years), results are uncertain because it
depends on the length of the migration from copper to fibre. The FTTH investment profitability is positive considering the
optimistic scenario that the migration is achieved in five years and negative if the migration takes 20 years. Thus, assuming
that the profitability of fibre investment is negative, the profitability of the wholesale business has to be negative to obtain a
positive result in the economic replicability test.
Consequently, if it is abundantly clear there is no form of discrimination, an economic replicability test (including the
access seeker’s fixed and variable costs) would nevertheless find that the operator behaves in a discriminatory manner and
result in a false positive.
Therefore this formulation of the economic replicability test would squeeze upstream investments. The access price
would have to be adjusted to secure the access seeker’s downstream business, thus transferring all the investment risk to
the upstream wholesale business. This type of policy, which guarantees the access seeker’s profitability and weakens the
upstream business case, would make extensive upstream investments economically irrational for fibre investors.9 A scenario of spontaneous and fast migration of the demand should not be confused with a scenario of forced migration related to a mandatory
per switch-off. A forced migration would generate additional migration costs not considered here.
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The specific analysis presented in this section holds as long as the cost standard of the economic replicability test
fully covers the wholesale price paid by the access seeker: it holds for nonlinear wholesale prices with the fixed
wholesale part included, i.e. as a mark-up on top of the variable wholesale part. It would also hold for fully linear
wholesale prices, for which the analysis above would strictly apply as well and would imply to set linear wholesale
price below upstream costs.
3.2. An economic replicability test based on variable wholesale prices
As mentioned before, the two-part wholesale price, in an NGA context, would be composed of: A wholesale variable access price that directly depends on the number of customers;
 A wholesale fixed cost that does not vary with the access seeker’s number of customers.The two-part structure makes it possible to accurately account for the singularity of an NGA investor’s cost structure
characterized by a significant share of fixed costs. The economic replicability test could be operational only if the fixed
wholesale costs are excluded from the test for two reasons: It is difficult to regulate fixed wholesale prices because the regulator is supposed to devise a rule for spreading fixed costs
among operators. It is possible to spread fixed costs based on market share. However, in a growing market, it is likely that
this distribution would rapidly become invalid. It seems difficult and hardly effective to constantly adapt regulations to
market characteristics. In addition to these logistical impediments, and on a more fundamental level, adjusting fixed fees
to market share would change fixed fees into variable fees and defeat the entire purpose of two-part pricing; It is impossible to run an LRICþ test (including variable and fixed costs) using a DCF over a customer lifetime for the
reasons described in Section 3.1. The outcome of the test would be unpredictable over an infrastructure lifetime and
depend on market conditions, rather than incumbent operator behaviour.
Therefore, it is necessary to exclude the investment infrastructure fixed costs from the economic replicability test insofar
as these fixed costs are translated into a fixed wholesale price.
Hence, the economic replicability test becomes:
prfZavf þcf
The NGA retail prices, prf, would be compared with the sum of wholesale variable NGA prices avf and to the NGA
downstream cost cf. In this expression, the subscript r refers to retail (as opposed to wholesale), f to fibre for NGA networks
(as opposed to copper), v to variable (as opposed to fixed).
This formulation of the economic replicability test makes it possible to regulate the variable part of wholesale prices and
guarantee fair competition between all competitors that access the NGA infrastructure. The test results would not be subject
to the uncertainty of the NGA business case.
The nonlinearity in the wholesale price is inherent to the existence of risky fibre investment costs. When only a small
proportion of copper is replaced by fibre, the separation between fixed and variable costs and the effect of excluding the
fixed costs from the economic replicability test are reduced in due proportion.
However, this economic replicability test does not explain how to determine the fixed part of wholesale prices and, more
specifically, it does not guarantee that a competitor which is as efficient as the investor can pay the fixed costs and migrate
from a copper infrastructure to an NGA infrastructure and compete on NGA products.
The answer to these questions lies in the introduction of a second “competition migration test.” The wholesale fixed price
will not be regulated by the NGA economic replicability test, but can be efficiently negotiated between access providers and
access seekers if the access provider also undergoes a second “competition migration test” designed to balance out the
bargaining power in these negotiations.
3.3. A transitory test to secure access for efficient entrants to NGA infrastructure: “the competition migration test”
As mentioned in the introduction, this paper addresses the issue of designing the economic replicability test where
nonlinear wholesale prices may be appropriate to fairly divide investment risks. These cases are only relevant insofar
as the NGA network’s rollout implies the copper infrastructure will be replaced by fibre investment. If only a small
part of the copper infrastructure is replaced by fibre, i.e., if FTTN or FTTC solutions are used, then wholesale prices
should only be slightly nonlinear (i.e., limited volume discounts) and the difference between the proposed test and a
conventional test will also be limited. However, if the entire copper infrastructure is replaced with fibre like in FTTH
architecture, wholesale prices will be extremely nonlinear (i.e., co-financing, significant upfront payments or higher
volume discounts) and the difference between the proposal of this article and a conventional test will also be more
significant.
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the incumbent operator does not have significant market power in the retail copper-based broadband market. This means
that it cannot directly control the migration of the bulk of retail customers from copper to NGA infrastructure. The market
share resulting from customer migration alone is presumably insufficient for amortising its NGA investment, otherwise its
competitors could also develop and amortise profitably with their own alternative infrastructure and migrate their own
retail customers to this alternative infrastructure. Complete infrastructure competition would be sustainable in this case,
which is not the scenario analysed in this paper or covered by the European Commission Recommendation (2013).
In other words, in this situation, the NGA investor has no opportunity to make a profit from an NGA investment unless its
copper-based competitors’ broadband customers migrate from its copper infrastructure to its NGA infrastructure. Furthermore, all
relevant competitors initially offer copper services.11 They are all at the top of the “copper ladder” and have to decide whether to
enter the NGAmarket. During the technological transition, the operators that develop NGA access continue to offer copper services.
To attract the greatest number of customers, the investor could then be tempted to practice very low retail prices—lower
than those offered in the copper broadband market. At the same time, the investor could also be tempted to set high fixed
prices for access to infrastructure to foreclose its competitors from the market insofar as the fixed costs are left out of the
test. An economic replicability test based on variable prices would not discourage such behaviour by investors on its own. To
prevent this, a second transitory test should be added called the “competition migration test. The following parts of Section
3.3 detail the mechanisms by which this additional test meets these objectives.
3.3.1. The “competition migration test”
The second test is meant to ensure migration of the broadband market’s competitive structure to the NGA market. The
“competition migration test” ensures that the investor’s NGA retail prices do not foreclose efficient copper-based entrants.
For this purpose, the test stipulates that an access provider’s NGA retail price should conduct an LRICþ margin squeeze
test on copper. At first glance, as the NGA network offers better quality than copper, it appears natural to also include an
NGA premium that could be measured by the difference in consumer utility between copper and NGA networks. The test is
thus formulated as follows:
prfZacþccþUf Uc
where like in Section 3.2. prf is the retail price for the NGA offer, ac is the wholesale regulated copper access charge, cc is the
leader’s downstream cost, Uf is utility for a consumer with access to an NGA network and Uc is the utility for a consumer
with access to a copper network. The subscripts are the same as in Section 3.2.
However, the integration of the NGA premium raises the question of its real existence in the market and how to
estimate it.
Consumer utility does not depend solely on the technical quality of the products. Increasing technical quality entails
increasing usage value and safeguarding the overall quality of the consumer experience. Today, an observation of market data
in most regions of the world does not indicate any significant difference in value between NGA and copper services. There is
little or no premium observed in the pricing for NGA products around the world, particularly for the following reasons: There are currently few or no NGA-specific services;
 A perception that copper networks are well-suited for customer usage: no perception of network congestion specific to
copper access networks, copper and NGA networks share resources in the backhaul and transport networks;
 From the consumer standpoint, the costs of migrating from copper to NGA (time and complexity of NGA home
installation, compatibility issues with the customer’s existing equipment, change in how services are navigated, etc.).
Furthermore, from an operational point of view, it appears difficult to estimate the difference in consumer utility
between copper and NGA services. It may be possible to approximate it using the difference in consumer willingness to pay
between fast and very fast broadband, but initially the available data would only initially come from the incumbent which
introduces an endogeneity bias. In the short term, the test should therefore be formulated as follows:
prfZacþcc
More fundamentally, the question of whether to include the NGA premium in the test is not limited to the observation of
market practice or technical constraints: it may prove to be a strategic decision by the regulator to promote investment.
If the analysis of market data reveals the existence of a premium, a regulator may consider whether to introduce it in the
test, given that integrating the NGA premium tends to decrease both the incentive to migrate for access seekers and the
incentive to invest for SMP operators compared to non-inclusion (see Section 3.3.2. on the negotiation process).
Furthermore, these behaviours are intrinsically linked.
If the NGA premium is added to the test, the NGA retail price offered by the investor is likely to be less price competitive
than the copper retail price chosen by the access seeker. The access seeker could thus decide to stay in the copper market and10 Additional provisions would be needed in the event of significant market power on the retail market.
11 Here, the concern of the paper as well as the Recommendation is “intra-platform competition.”
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less for access to the NGA infrastructure; this reduces the investor’s returns on investment and thus discourages investments.
At the same time, the investor can decide to increase its copper retail price to make NGA services more competitive and
encourage its customers to migrate. However, if only its customers migrate, its profits will be insufficient to amortise its
investment. The lack of competitiveness of NGA services could cause the investor to underinvest.
On the other hand, if the NGA premium is not included, the NGA prices proposed by the investor may be at least as
competitive as the copper prices offered by its competitors while providing higher utility to consumers. Access seekers will
feel strong pressure to adopt the new infrastructure and thus be willing to pay more for fixed access to the NGA infrastructure.
Hence, the utility of NGA investment will be returned to the investor, encouraging it to invest at a socially optimal level.
Finally, since there is still competition between copper and NGA networks, the investor cannot set a high NGA retail
price, otherwise too few customers would migrate and it would be unprofitable.
Section 3.3.2 will consider that the “competition migration test” does not include the NGA premium for all the reasons
provided above.
3.3.2. Negotiation process between the investor and the access seeker to determine the fixed infrastructure price
By design, the “competition migration test” introduces a constraint in determining fixed infrastructure prices. The only
way to achieve consumer migration on a sufficient scale is to encourage alternative operators to migrate along with their
customers. Therefore, the investor must agree with each of its competitors on a wholesale fixed price that allows them to
access the NGA infrastructure and operate in the NGA retail market. The constraint of the transitory “competition migration
test” gives the alternative operators bargaining power to negotiate the wholesale access fixed price.
Since the “competition migration test” prevents the investor lowering its prices to attract the maximum number of
clients to the NGA network, the only way to monetize its investment in new infrastructures is to ensure a level of fixed
prices that would allow operators and their clients to migrate to the NGA network.
Indeed, as mentioned above, the two alternative conditions for which the investor would not need its competitors’
clients to migrate en masse would be as follows: The investor starts from a strongly dominant position in the copper-based broadband retail market, which would allow it
to control the migration process of the whole copper customer base to NGA. This is not the standard situation cited in the
EC Recommendation, which assumes that the initial copper-based broadband market is competitive, and therefore it is
not the hypothesis retained in this paper; The NGA investment is profitable, even with a limited number of customers. In this case, several operators could build their
own profitable networks. The existence of such infrastructure-based competition would make the economic replicability
test irrelevant. But this is not the hypothesis retained in the EC Recommendation or subsequently in this paper.
Apart from these two specific cases, to make their activity profitable, investors need its competitors’ retail customers to
migrate from copper to NGA.
At the same time, as recommended by the European Commission, significant market power (SMP) operators and access
seekers have to “share some of the investment risk by differentiating wholesale access prices according to the access
seeker’s level of commitment.”
In the absence of strong dominance by the incumbent in the broadband market, there is at least one large access based
competitor. The incumbent and this access seeker would be in a position to negotiate a fixed fee that the access seeker is
willing to pay for access to the NGA infrastructure. The two forces described previously will be in opposition: The access seeker’s willingness to pay the lowest fixed fee and the investor’s need for the access seeker to migrate to the
NGA network; An objective where the investor and the access seeker share some of the investment risk in proportion to the market
share that they anticipate obtaining in the retail market.
It should be noted that both parties have reason to reach an agreement reasonably quickly: the incumbent because the
profitability of its investment depends on its competitors’ customers migrating quickly and its largest rival because it would
be a commercial risk to leave the incumbent alone on the NGA market or let the incumbent be the first to reach an
agreement with another competitor.
Moreover, once the incumbent has reached an agreement with one competitor on the fixed wholesale fee for accessing
the NGA infrastructure, and as long as authorities apply the transitory “competition migration test,” it will feel strong
pressure to agree with other competitors on their fixed fee. First, because a competitor that gains access to the NGA
infrastructure may undercut its retail price and second, because these other competitors may negotiate access with both the
incumbent and its initial competitor.
Once the authorities consider that negotiations on fixed wholesale access fees have generated an adequately competitive
market structure on the NGA infrastructure and each efficient access seeker has secured access to the NGA infrastructure,
the second transitory test may be removed.
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copper infrastructure is completely replaced by the NGA infrastructure. In intermediate cases of partial replacement, the
proposal remains valid but is less significant to the extent that a two-part wholesale price structure would only affect the
replaced proportion of the access infrastructure. In the absence of significant fibre rollout and correlated investment risk,
there is no justification for a nonlinear wholesale access price. In this context, both the economic replicability test based on
variable wholesale pricing and the competition migration test converge towards a unique standard margin squeeze test.
Obviously, a formal microeconomic model on this qualitative reasoning would provide more rigorous insight into the
likely outcome of the proposed process. In further research, it would be interesting to theoretically model the negotiation
process described above to determine the level of the fixed equilibrium price.4. The proposed dual-test system in terms of existing regulatory theory and practice: overcoming the limits of the ladder
of investment approach
This section discusses how the two-test system proposed can be integrated into existing regulatory theory and practice.
In particular, it is meant to overcome the well-known limits of the “ladder of investment” approach in the context of NGA
investments and integrate the “business migration effect” developed by Bourreau et al. (2012).
The “ladder of investment” (LoI) is a regulatory approach proposed by Cave (2006). The idea is to provide entrants with
several levels of access to the incumbent network–the “rungs of the ladder”–in such a way that alternative operators can climb
up the ladder and progressively develop their own infrastructure. From a theoretical point of view, this approach considers that
service-based and facility-based entries are complementary and not two alternative ways of promoting competition.
Since the very beginning, the “ladder of investment” approach has widely influenced the European telecommunications
policy areas and broadband regulation. In its 2005 broadband market competition report, the European Regulators Group
(ERG) analysed and explained the impact of regulatory intervention with the “ladder of investment concept.” In the
Commission Recommendation of 20 September, 2010, on regulated access to Next-generation Access Networks, the
European Commission indicates that “the appropriate array of remedies imposed by an NRA should reflect a proportionate
application of the ladder of investment principle.”
Some papers have already studied the application of the LoI approach in the NGA context (see Hori and Mizuno (2006),
Vareda and Hoerning (2007) and Cave (2010)). They recommend using instruments that are basically the same as those
applied to regulate copper broadband (access prices increasing over time and regulatory holidays). The limits of the LoI
approach in the NGA context are highlighted by Bacache, Bourreau and Gaudin (2014). They used an empirical model with
data from the European Commission to test the “ladder of investment approach” in the NGA context. The “ladder of
investment” is composed of three rungs: bitstream access, local loop unbundling and new access facilities. Bacache et al. found
no empirical support for the LoI hypothesis in the transition from local loop unbundling to NGA infrastructures. In other words,
they found that the number of unbundled lines has no impact on investment in new access infrastructures by new entrants.
However, the literature considers a hypothesis where new technology is the next rung of this ladder and should
immediately replace old technology: the investment decision is classified as “zero-one.” As Cave (2010) emphasised, the
issue is more complex for NGAs. Regulators have to think both vertically (i.e., how competing providers can climb the ladder
by building their own fibre network) and horizontally about movements from one ladder to another (see Fig. 1). European
operators are right between the two ladders and operate on both networks. However, he “ladder of investment” approach
fails to explain this intermediary situation where different generations of technologies co-exist.
The importance of analysing incentives to migrate from “old” to “new” technology has been put forward by Bourreau
et al. (2012), who use game theory to analyse the incentives for incumbents and entrants to migrate from “old” technology
to “new” technology (NGA network). They find that NGA-related investment incentives are impacted by access regulation
charges in the “old” copper networks via three effects: A “replacement effect” that reduces investment incentives for alternative operators when the “old” infrastructure access
price is low; A “wholesale revenue effect” where the old infrastructure revenue decreases with the access price. The incentive to
invest in new infrastructure is related to the profitability of the access services on the old infrastructure; The “business migration effect” which stipulates that there is a link between the wholesale and retail prices of the old
infrastructure and the retail price of the new infrastructure. According to Bourreau et al. (2012), if the access price of the
old infrastructure is low, then retail prices based on that network are also low. To encourage customers to switch from
the “old” infrastructure to the “new” infrastructure, operators should thus also offer low prices for NGA. In this case, the
profitability of the new infrastructure is also low, as is the incentive to invest in NGA networks. Consequently, they
demonstrate that “regulators cannot treat the two access prices to the two different technologies independently.”The objective of their paper is to determine the right level of copper prices to spur investment in an NGA network.
Bourreau et al. (2012) concluded that if regulators want to encourage the incumbents to invest in NGA, they cannot set
wholesale copper prices at a low level.
Fig. 1. Migration between the ladders (Cave (2010)).
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addressed. The idea is not to evaluate the impact of the legacy network’s wholesale access price on the incumbent’s NGA
investment, but rather to analyse how copper prices can interfere with the implementation of NGA regulations. The
interdependence between copper and fibre prices is materialized through this specific “competition migration test.” This
test overcomes the limits of the “ladder of investment” approach integrating what Bourreau et al. (2012) named the
“business migration effect.” The formulation of the second test demonstrates that the interdependence between copper and
NGA prices must also be considered when determining NGA retail prices.
As explained previously, for the purpose of this paper, all competitors offer copper services and have to decide whether to
enter the NGA market. During the technological transition, they develop NGA access keep while maintaining copper services
for a smooth migration between both generations of access networks in the presence of high infrastructure costs.
Thus, a competitive provider could be in a transitional phase, represented by the “grey zone” in Fig. 2 where the
investment decision is not 0 or 1 but somewhere in between. Through the NGA regulation, one of the objectives of the
regulator is to make sure that the entrants migrate from the “copper” ladder to the “NGA” ladder, in other words to help
operators cross the bridge depicted in Fig. 2.
The set of two tests proposed in this paper, notably with the introduction of an interdependence condition between old and
new infrastructure prices, are innovative tools to ensure “the business migration” but also the “competitive structure migration.”
The economic replicability test based on variable wholesale prices regulates the variable part of the wholesale price and
thus guarantees fair competition between all competitors that access the NGA infrastructure. The second test ensures that
efficient operators can pay the fixed price to secure access to the NGA.5. Conclusion
Defining the economic replicability test for NGA services is a highly topical issue. It must be accurate to prevent
discouraging investment because, as demonstrated in this paper, NGA economics is incompatible with the conventional
margin squeeze test used by regulators.
This paper addresses the question of how to implement the economic replicability test for NGA networks. This test is required
by the Recommendation to regulate wholesale prices and takes into account the fact that, as the Recommendation itself suggests,
nonlinear wholesale pricing is appropriate to better reconcile investment and competition than linear wholesale pricing.
The test must also be built in a way that fulfils the EC’s double objective of encouraging NGA investment and preserving
the competitive structure inherited from copper unbundling while following the principle of fair allocation of investment
risks between access providers and access seekers.
This paper demonstrates that in order to be operational and consistent with the Recommendation’s objectives, the NGA
economic replicability test must exclude the fixed part of wholesale prices. However, although meeting the European
Commission’s policy objective precludes the exclusion of the fixed part of wholesale prices from the NGA economic replicability
test’s cost standard, it is not sufficient. A single economic replicability test cannot explain how to determine fixed wholesale
prices and, in particular, it does not guarantee that an operator that is as efficient as the investor can pay the fixed costs and have
access to the NGA infrastructure. Therefore, a second transitory test should be added called the “competition migration test”
which ensures the incumbent’s NGA retail and wholesale prices will not foreclose copper-based efficient entrants during the
Fig. 2. Migration between the ladders accounting for interdependence between old and new infrastructures (adapted from Cave (2010).
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fixed wholesale price. The second test is meant to preserve the competitive structure inherited from unbundling regulations on
the copper market by ensuring that a competitive market structure can migrate from copper to NGA infrastructure.
This pair of tests overcomes the limits of “the ladder of investment” theory by integrating “the business migration effect”
concept developed by Bourreau et al. (2012). These two tests solve the dynamic consistency issue that Europe is facing:
encouraging NGA investment while preserving the benefits of competitive markets. This economic analysis would also be
relevant for a margin squeeze test under competition law.
The concept of two-part access prices, with a different form of regulation for each part of the tariffs may have broader
applications than the one described here. However, this specification does not claim to be a robust general theory for all
situations; it is only relevant for meeting the two-pronged requirement of infrastructure investment and competitive
structure safeguards in European fixed telecommunications markets.Acknowledgement
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may not in any circumstances be regarded as a position of Orange.Appendix. Numerical example showing that a conventional interpretation of the LRICþ NGA economic replicability test
would be an inappropriate benchmark for determining discriminatory behaviour
This appendix presents the details of the numerical example where an LRICþ test is performed using a DCF method over
a customer lifetime, including the fixed and variable parts of the wholesale price in the cost standard, following what we
refer to here as a conventional interpretation of the economic replicability test presented by the European Commission in its
Recommendation. The example shows that this type of test would almost certainly produce a negative result, even absent
any form of discrimination between the access provider investing in an NGA network and the access seeker. If the test is
performed as a DCF over the infrastructure lifetime instead of the customer lifetime, the numerical example shows that the
outcome may be positive or negative depending on the market conditions, and absent any form of discrimination between
the access provider and the access seeker.
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test” is not a reliable benchmark for detecting economic discrimination between the access provider and the access seeker,
although this is the role assigned to this test in the EC Recommendation. To prove the irrelevance of a conventional interpretation
of the test as a means of detecting discrimination, there is no need to provide a comprehensive analysis of all the possible results
of the test in a wide spectrum of configurations. Logically, a single counterexample for a reasonable configuration is enough to
dispel the belief that a conventional version of the test could adequately identify economic discrimination.
The test is done using the specific case of an FTTH investment rather than a more general NGA example. FTTH is one of the
main cases of interest since it corresponds to the full replacement of the copper loop by an investment in fibre infrastructure.
Any other form of NGA would be an intermediate case, with the effects reduced proportionately compared to FTTH.
The figures given in the numerical example were chosen to be reasonable and are for illustration only. They are drawn
from public sources or internal sources in line with commonly known figures, although they should not be considered
directly representative of any specific operator.
Here the effects of an LRICþ economic replicability test are described in a scenario with asymmetric access to passive
infrastructures where the fixed and variable parts of wholesale prices are both included in the cost standard.
The general cost and demand features of the FTTH investment case are detailed before considering the case of an access
seeker and performing the conventional version of the LRICþ economic replicability test.
1. Costs estimation
Companies face both investment costs and operational variable costs when deploying fibre infrastructure for their
customers.
1.1. Investment costs
A global average investment cost of €1,000 per FTTH customer is considered, which may be split into two parts at roughly
70–30%:–“Th
Nov
opt
Yup
“NG
212
in iTo serve FTTH customers, an operator must first deploy its infrastructure, which generates an investment cost per eligible
customer (a customer who has access to fibre infrastructure). For all eligible FTTH customers, the investment cost of
access to the passive mutualised FTTH infrastructure is €700 per eligible customer;– For commercial FTTH customers, the investment cost to build an individual fibre drop line is €300 per contracted FTTH customer.
These hypotheses are globally consistent with consensus among consultants and experts.12
In the numerical example, an infrastructure lifetime of 20 years is considered, in line with the accounting lifetime used in
documents such as Orange’s published accounts and a five-year customer lifetime, which is in the high range of the figures
typically used by regulatory and competition authorities.
1.2. Variable downstream costs (DC)
When an eligible customer adopts the service and becomes a commercial customer, the operator faces a variable cost per
commercial customer. For commercial customers, the company has to bear three types of variable downstream costs: Costs of networks, commercial resources and activities shared with ADSL customers, which can be estimated around €15
per month per customer; Costs of specific FTTH commercial network resources and activities, outside the access infrastructure estimated at €10
(1–p) per month per customer, where p is the ratio of commercial FTTH customers to all eligible FTTH customers, i.e. the
penetration rate. These costs represent the specific technical and commercial efforts that the operator must deploy to
encourage and support the migration of ADSL customers to FTTH infrastructure (door-to-door campaigns, initial specific
processes and problem-solving, higher core network costs due to higher usage). These extra costs are high when FTTH is
marginal and drop as the FTTH penetration rate increases, thanks to the learning curve and the (optimistically)
increasing appeal of FTTH access to customers. Cost-oriented price for duct usage, i.e., €3 per month per customer, on top of FTTH infrastructure cost.
To summarise, variable downstream costs per month per customer are DC¼€ (15þ10(1–p)þ3).12 In Analysys (2006): “Fibre in the last mile: le business case for FTTP and VDSL”, Analysys Research Limited, Cambridge (UK) as quoted in WIK-consult
e Economics of next generation access” (2008), p. 12, FTTP-GPON costs around €1000 in investments.J-L Silicani, Chairman of Arcep, French regulator 16
ember 2011, Idate Digiworld summit, 21 billion to cover all 25 million French customers, excluding costs for final drop and customer premises. Minimal
imal FTTH investment cost for dense urban areas, should cost €809 following a cost model from an equipment manufacturer (Juan Rendon Schneir,
eng Xiong, Huawei, Communication at the 24th Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society, Florence, Italy, October 2013). In
A deployment costs” Idate Research M12304 (November 2012), the Executive Summary p. 5 indicates €229 billion in investment for full FTTH/B of the
million households in Europe 27.In “FTTx business models” Idate Consulting and Research M81508 (January 2009), p. 25 Fig 8, indicates around €1,500
nvestments for FTTH technology, 25–30% for subscriber connections.
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As mentioned above, p is the ratio of commercial FTTH customers to all eligible FTTH customers, i.e., the penetration rate.
Two ex-ante demand scenarios are considered:Tele
perPositive scenario: p¼up 20% per year after investment, which indicates that the migration is achieved in five years
(p¼20% in Year 1, 40% in Year 2, 60% in Year 3, 80% in Year 4, 100% in Year 5); Negative scenario: p¼up 5% per year after investment, which implies that the migration is achieved in 20 years.
The positive scenario of spontaneous and fast migration of the demand should not be confused with a scenario of forced
migration related to a mandatory copper switch-off. A forced migration would generate additional migration costs which
are not considered here.
The average revenue per user (ARPU) for an FTTH commercial customer is estimated at €35 per month, in line with
values observed in Western Europe’s most competitive retail markets.3. Modelled access seeker
In this example, the access seeker benefits from a situation where it does not suffer from any form of disadvantage or
discrimination compared with the investor: 50% market share;
 Cost-oriented wholesale price, which here means 50% of a €700 upfront investment per potential customer, plus €300
investment per commercial customer;
 Wholesale duct price is €3 per month per FTTH commercial customer;
 Same downstream cost as the incumbent: DC¼€ (15þ10(1–p)þ3) including duct price, following the Equivalently
Efficient Operator (EEO) hypothesis supported by EC Recommendation.
4. Calculation of a conventional LRICþ economic replicability test
Consistent with the access seeker model detailed in the paragraph above, the discounted cash flow outcome reflects the results
of the LRICþ economic replicability test when the competitor has exactly the same business case that the investor (50% market
share, same costs and same revenues). So, it is clear that the access seeker does not suffer from any form of discrimination when
compared with the access provider. However, applying a conventional version of the LRICþ economic replicability test would lead
to the opposite conclusion: according to the test, the access seeker would supposedly suffer discrimination because the test is
negative. Thus the exercise shows that this version of the test cannot be used as a reliable tool to characterise discrimination.
Further information is required in order to fully specify the DCF calculation:– The cost of capital is presumed to be 10% (WACC: weighted average cost of capital);
– Two alternative durations are considered to calculate the DCF: the test is conducted by alternating between a customer
lifetime of five years and an infrastructure lifetime of twenty years;– In principle, the terminal value at the end of duration of the DCF calculation reflects the residual economic life of the
physical asset and acquired customers. The European Commission defined the terminal value which should be taken into
account for a DCF calculation as follows in the Telefónica case13: the terminal value should be equal to the net accounting
value, i.e., the cumulated investment minus the cumulated linear depreciation of assets.14
These elements fully specify the DCF calculation. Test results are given in Fig. 3 below.
The test is systematically negative (infringement of the economic replicability condition) when performed using a DCF
method for a customer lifetime (5 years). When the test is performed using a DCF method and the infrastructure lifetime (20
years), the results were uncertain depending on the length of the migration from copper to fibre. The test is positive only
under the favourable hypothesis that the migration is achieved in five years and negative if the migration takes 20 years.
Thus, with this formulation of the test, an FTTH investor could be accused of not complying with the economic
replicability test in a situation where there is no actual discrimination and where the result of the test depends of market
conditions and not on discriminatory behaviour.13 Commission Decision of 04.07.2007 relating to a proceedings under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España vs.
fónica).
14 “The size of this terminal value is the cost of unrecovered assets (physical assets and acquisition costs) remaining to be recovered after the five-year
iod of the analysis”. (Commission Decision of 04.07.2007, (363)).
Fig. 3. Economic replicability test results.
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